On Apr 12, 2005, at 8:58 AM, Kuestner, Bjoern wrote: >> if you simply change the place where sudo logs to, >> the security hazard is removed without added inconvenience. > > I think you have to not only change the place but also > a) secure that a script cannot easily read from a config file the new > location > b) better, secure the permission for the new log file. If you read the official note at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/395107/2005-04-03/2005-04-09/0 it will recommend to change the logging to /var/log/secure.log which is owned by root and chmod 600 by default > Even then I'm not sure if that is secure enough for the paranoid (does > not include me). But as the devil's advocate I could imagine a script > that tries to run a sudo command every four minutes. I don't think > you're blocked in any way if you fail with a sudo attempt. So sooner > or later an attempt will succeed because the user happened to use sudo > 2 minutes before that. True, however if someone can login to an account with admin privileges then you already have security problems. > I guess the only secure way for OS X and other Unixish systems is to > remove the grace period after a sudo command. The tty restriction: Defaults:ALL tty_tickets is a good one. I'm concerned that removing the grace period entirely would lead people to choose weaker passwords, which is a much bigger security threat. TjL