Various attacks activate at the privilege level of the active legitimate user or the active process. Avoiding root as much as possible is a standard security measure. Cf the current Secunia 11622 security problem with OSX (which I think has been brought up on this tiBook list). Note one of the interim "Best practices recommendations" is "Do not surf the Internet as a privileged user." Some suggest creating a separate non-admin user and web browse only as that non-admin user. http://secunia.com/advisories/11622/ http://www.euronet.nl/~tekelenb/playground/security/URLschemes/ Actually, FWIW, Kynan's description of the root user pecularity he ran into (while testing about the Dvorak issue) sounded to me, from the incomplete info given, not inconsistent with a possibility of a root-level-access backdoor being present. On Sun, 30 May 2004, Kynan Shook wrote: > Enabling the root user is not a security risk; it's just risking > allowing an uninformed user to do things he or she shouldn't. Even > "sudo" is a risk that way; a sudo rm can do major damage if you put a > space in the wrong location in the path name. The only way that > enabling the root user would be a security risk is if it has a weak > password, in which case your admin account is probably at a similar > risk. . . . > "Tom R. no spam" <tr5374 at csc.albany.edu> writes: > > Always worth mentioning that having root user enabled can be > > a significant security vulnerability. That's why it's not > > activated in default state of OSX, having the "sudo" command > > line functionality available instead. And if Kynan's system is > > in this irregular a state after his actions, this root being > > available even tho the system seems not to know it seems > > worth being concerned about.